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Abstract    The paper focuses on concepts and words referring to odors and to 
objects that have an odor. We argue that odors are an interesting object of study since 
they are evanescent, and since odor words do not refer to concrete and manipulable 
objects, but to scents evoked by objects. A second reason why odors are interesting is 
that some languages, as the Western ones, lack a specific odor lexicon, comparable in 
richness and variety to the color lexicon, and that performance on odors naming is 
typically worse than performance in color naming. In this work we discuss three 
main issues. First, we illustrate literature showing that, even if odor words do not 
have concrete referents, many languages encode them quite easily: the case of odors 
suggests that word meaning cannot be exhausted by the relationship with a referent, 
and highlights the importance of the social sharing of meaning. Second, we have 
discussed the peculiar status of odor concepts and words. Given their ambiguous 
status, their simple existence poses problems both to theories according to which 
concrete and abstract concepts do not differ, and to theories according to which they 
represent a dichotomy. Finally, we present an experiment in which we show that 
names of objects evoke their smell, and that these smells evoke approach and 
avoidance movements, in line with theories according to which words are grounded 
in both sensorial and motor systems. 
Keywords: language, ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ concepts, olfaction, perception, 
action, approach-avoidance, embodied and grounded cognition. 
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0. Introduction 
This paper focuses on odors, and specifically on concepts and words referring to odors 
and to objects that have an odor. Curiously the cognitive literature on odors is not broad 
as the literature on color, or on shape. We believe instead that odors represent an 
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interesting case of study, full of theoretical implications. Odors seem rather evanescent: 
they are not objects, but are rather scents evoked by objects. Odor concepts cannot be 
considered as concrete concepts, since they do not possess specific, bounded referent, 
but at the same time they cannot be considered as completely abstract, since they 
activate our senses. They can be perceived through olfaction, but apparently they do 
not evoke actions. The odor case is therefore challenging for embodied and grounded 
theories of cognition (BARSALOU, 2008) because odors concepts place themselves 
somewhere between concrete and abstract ones.  
Another reason to concentrate on the odor concepts pertains the way in which they 
are linguistically encoded. Classical behavioral evidence showed marked differences 
in performance on visual objects naming and smell sources naming. Seminal studies 
about odor naming demonstrated that if a sample of participants was able to correctly 
name about the totally of common visual object pictures, in an analogue naming task 
conducted on smells they were able to indicate less than the 50% of common odor 
sources (e.g., CAIN, 1979; ENGEN, ROSS, 1973). Odor concepts seem namely to 
represent a case study for language acquisition (WILSON, STEVENSON, 2006), 
because of the differences in odor lexicon across different languages. More recent 
studies have shown that the richness of the odor lexicon greatly differs across 
cultures. Languages spoken by cultures living in quite a ‘natural’ habitat have a 
richer odor lexicon in comparison to languages spoken by cultures living in a more 
artificial and technological habitat. 
In the following pages we will discuss some theoretical issues that odor words raise. 
First, we will explain that in spite of their apparent evanescence, language can easily 
encode odor words, as revealed by cross-linguistic evidence. Treating of odors will 
help us to discuss what linguistic meaning is. Second, we will argue that odors can 
tell something on the distinction between concrete and abstract concepts. Third, we 
will show by means of a behavioral experiment that words referring to objects evoke 
odors, and that these odors, in spite of their apparent evanescence and abstractness, 
activate actions. !!
1. Odor words and linguistic meaning  
Notwithstanding a very widespread commonplace (MAIJD, BURENHULT, 2014), 
«human languages can encode odors» (WNUK, MAJID 2014: 136). Recent evidence 
shows that the often reported difficulties in encoding odors (ENGEN, ENGEN 1997; 
RICHARDSON, ZUCCO 1989; YESHURUN, SOBEL 2010) are not the results of 
presumed intrinsic limits of Language (in general) in attributing a name to odors. 
According to this commonplace, while it is somewhat simple to give a name to a material 
thing, like a bottle for example, it would be intrinsically difficult to individuate and to 
name a flavor. The problem would lie in the fact that while a bottle is an entity with 
precise boundaries, that is an entity delimitated in space and time, a flavor cannot be 
delimitated in the same way. The commonplace implicitly holds that Language is at ease 
when confronted with objects and simple events, whilst it is in trouble when the entity 
that has to be named has not such characteristics. From this point of view odors seem the 
worst entities Language can face. Luckily, cross-cultural evidence shows that this is just a 
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commonplace (MAJID, BURENHULT, 2014). Jahai speakers of the Malay Peninsula, 
for example, are able to name odors so as colors. In particular, their odor lexicon is 
abstract and structured, that is, basic Jahai odor names do not derive from a particular 
object, which emits a similar odor: «whereas English speakers grappled to find words for 
odors, Jahai speakers could name odors with the same conciseness and level of 
agreement as colors» (p. 269). Anthropologists have revealed fascinating examples of 
cultures, as the Barek Negrito of peninsula Malaysia, who use smell to classify things in 
their environment: for example, the sun would have a bad smell, as “raw meat”, whereas 
the moon would be characterized by a good smell, like that of flowers (HOWES & 
CLASSEN, 2013). The Jahai and the Barek Negrito examples apparently show that the 
difficulties Western people encounter in naming odors are not at all universal (MAJID, 
BURENHULT, 2014); English speakers difficulties in naming odors are not the sign that 
Language cannot cope with the smells. Such a difficulty is simply the sign of a peculiar 
difficulty of Western society (and therefore of Western languages) with smells. The 
difficulty in naming odors is a problem of some languages, not of Language per se 
(MAIJD, LEVINSON 2011). Furthermore, even in Western languages it has been 
demonstrated that the odor lexicon can be easily acquired. Western smells experts, like 
professional perfumers or enologists, are able to learn specific odor categories and to use 
a special language to talk about them, even if these categories and their labels are not 
shared by all the individuals of their cultures (ZARZO, STANTON, 2009). This evidence 
has also been confirmed by the finding of differences in the cerebral architecture of such 
experts, in particular an increase of the orbitofrontal gyrus, a region that seems to be 
fundamental for odor categorization (a recent review of neuroimaging literature is in 
OLOFSSON, GOTTFRIED, 2015). Giving the evidence described, and considering that 
it has been shown that in general the neural architecture of the smell system in Westerners 
lacks of connections to high-level functions areas (which include all the linguistic areas in 
the cortex) (see OLOFSSON, GOTTFRIED, 2015), it is possible that these differences 
are mainly culturally rooted: Western cultures are mainly focused on vision, and Western 
technology is mainly visually oriented. The extension of Western visual lexicons is 
impressive, and Western individuals learn this specific way of categorizing the world 
from the very beginning of their life. Thus, if it is true that differences between languages 
might directly affect the ways people think and organize their world, as hypothesized by 
Whorf's Linguistic Determinism, (e.g., WHORF 2000a, 2000b; GENTNER, 1982), it 
would be no surprise that the way to conceptualize reality of Western individuals is 
predominantly visual, with vision being the strongest force that scaffolds and structures 
their cognitive system, leaving the other senses in the background. 
The case of odors points to another general question, the very nature of linguistic 
meaning. According to a naïve exclusively referential view of Language, the 
meaning of a linguistic form is the object it is attached to. This referential view of 
language has dominated for long in cognitive science in general. For years not only 
defenders of traditional views of cognition but even proponents of an embodied 
cognition view, according to which human cognitive processes are influenced by 
bodily experiences, have assumed this referential view. In this vein, scientists 
adopting an embodied cognition view have tried to demonstrate that words activate 
the sensorimotor information associated to their referents (see BORGHI ET AL., 
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2013, for an extensive critique of such a view). For example, the embodied indexical 
theory (GLENBERG, ROBERTSON, 2000) claimed that words activate their 
referents, their perceptual characteristics and their affordances. While this attempt 
has been useful to contrast traditional propositional views (FODOR, 1983), 
according to which words are arbitrarily linked to their referents, at the same time it 
has sometimes led to neglect the importance of other words for the meaning of a 
specific word. What this theory misses to note is that every linguistic meaning is 
connected to other meanings. It is the uncritical adoption of such an unilateral view 
of meaning what makes so difficult to imagine how an odor could be named. 
Although it is true that odors are associated to specific sensations, they do not refer 
to concrete and manipulable objects, like a bottle. What such an idea of Language 
misses is that the linguistic meaning of a word cannot be exhausted by the possible 
referent of such a word. Until some years ago, embodied (and referential) views of 
language were considered as opposed to distributional views of language, according 
to which the meaning of a word is given by the co-occurrence of words in large 
corpora (e.g., LANDAUER, DUMAIS, 1997). Now hybrid approaches (e.g., 
ANDREWS ET AL., 2014) underline, instead, that both the word referent and the 
way in which words are used in a social context, along with the presence of other 
associated words, contribute to word meaning.  
This is exactly our position, and the case of odors illustrates it very well. In Jahai 
culture and life odors occupy a very important position (BURENHULT, MAJID, 
2011). Therefore, Jahai speakers need to be able to speak of odors in a competent and 
shared manner. The fact that odors do not present the characteristics of material 
objects by no means implies a linguistic obstacle for speakers. The point is exactly 
that the meaning is different from the referent. Put in another way: a linguistic form 
has a shared meaning even if it does not refer to a precise thing into the world 
(LUPYAN, WARD 2013; LUPYAN, CASASANTO, 2014). Take the case of this 
Wittgenstein example:  !
“The smell is marvellous!” Is there a doubt whether it is the smell that is 
marvellous? Is it a property of the smell? ‒ Why not? It is a property of ten to 
be divisible by two and also to be the number of my fingers. There might 
however be a language in which the people merely shut their eyes and say "Oh, 
this smell!" and there is no subject-predicate sentence equivalent to it. That is 
simply a 'specific' reaction (WITTGENSTEIN, 1967, § 551). !
According to Wittgenstein, and also to recent distributional views of language, the 
meaning of the sentence “Oh, this smell!” is the shared use ‒ what Wittgenstein calls 
«a ‘specific’ reaction» ‒ such a sentence evokes within a particular linguistic 
community. In such a perspective, the difference between meaning and referent is 
apparent. More precisely, the meaning of “Oh, this smell!” are the action and 
thoughts people entertain when using such a sentence.  
Our point is quite common in classical analytic philosophy of language: a word has a 
meaning even if it does not refer to a spatially bounded object, since the word 
meaning is different from its referent. To be more specific: the meaning of an odor 
word is prima facie what a human body does with such a word. Wittgenstein helps us 
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to avoid speaking of “ineffability” when confronted with the case of odors. Odors are 
not ineffable at all. The actual linguistic evidence (MAJID, BURENHULT 2014; 
MAJID 2015) clearly shows that cultures that rely more on ‘natural’ resources seem 
not to encounter the same difficulties in encoding odors than languages spoken by 
more ‘artificial’ and ‘technological’ cultures. Therefore, it seems to us that the 
importance of culture in linguistically encoding odors should not be underestimated. 
In our view both the referent of the word – in the case of odors it is not an object, but 
the scent evoked by a specific object or entity which activates a specific sense, 
olfaction – and the shared use of the word concur to determine meaning. If we avoid 
to equating meaning and referent, taking into account that there is more in the 
meaning than the mere relationship with a specific referent, the presumed ineffability 
of odors loses much of its theoretical attractiveness (LEVINSON, MAJID 2014). !!!
2. Are odor concepts concrete or abstract ones? 
The case of smells can be used to face a more general psychological question: the 
presumed difference existing between the so-called ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ 
concepts. A smell is a physical and chemical entity that cannot be exactly identified 
in space and time. Does it belong to concrete or to abstract concepts? According to 
two influential views, concrete and abstract concepts do not differ (for reviews, 
PECHER ET AL., 2011; BORGHI, BINKOFSKI, 2014). Classical views of 
cognition posit that words have an arbitrary relations with their referent, and that are 
represented through semi-linguistic properties. In this perspective, concrete and 
abstract concepts do not differ. Neither standard embodied views do intend abstract 
and concrete concepts as different, since they argue that both concrete and abstract 
concepts are grounded in the sensorimotor system. The interest of words which refer 
to smells is that they have an ambiguous status. On one side they allow some specific 
bodily actions (tasting a wine, for example; LEHRER, 1975), on the other side they 
refer to thousands of subtle and imperceptible entities (CROCKER, 1935). Could 
they be considered as concrete, since odor is emanated by a concrete object/entity? 
Or should they be considered as abstract, since smell cannot be seen, touched, 
manipulated? Clearly, odor words meanings place themselves somewhat in the 
middle between ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ concepts, so they neutralize such a 
venerable distinction. In this sense, they cannot be accounted for neither by classical 
views nor by standard embodied views, according to which no distinction between 
concrete and abstract concepts exist. It becomes instead necessary to assume that 
there is no concrete-abstract dichotomy, and that concreteness and abstractness are 
not all or none exclusive dimensions, but are graded, and that concepts are arranged 
along a continuum (WIEMER-HASTINGS ET AL., 2001). 
If it is true that words which refer to smells somehow neutralize the distinction 
between ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ concepts, we hypothesize that this should have a 
behavioral effect. On one side, the neural processing of a verb like “grasp” recruits 
the motor area of the brain (SCOROLLI, BORGHI 2007), while on the other side the 
processing of an adjective like “divine” (CRUTCH, WARRINGTON 2005) relies 
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more on linguistic brain areas. In the same vein, it has been shown through fMRI 
that, even if both concrete and abstract words activate sensorimotor areas, abstract 
sentences recruit more linguistic areas of the brain than concrete sentences 
(SAKREIDA ET AL., 2013). At a behavioral level, it has been shown that abstract 
concepts activate more the mouth (BORGHI ET AL., 2011; GHIO ET AL., 2013; 
GRANITO ET AL., 2015), while concrete ones activate more the hand. Since odor 
words have a sort of intermediate status between concrete and abstract words, we 
expect that, when presented with odor words, participants will react in an 
intermediate way between the typical reaction to a ‘pure’ concrete word and a ‘pure’ 
abstract word. The idea is that the processing of olfaction language requires both the 
activation of nose and hands on one side, and of language, and thus the mouth, on the 
other. Future research should be conducted to test such hypotheses. !!
3. Words evoke odors and odors evoke actions 
As we previously said, odors do not have concrete referents, even if scents are 
evoked by specific referents. Obviously odors can be perceived, but it is not at all 
obvious that they activate the motor system. In the experiment we will report, 
participants were presented with words referring to objects and were asked to 
evaluate whether they evoked a pleasant vs. unpleasant smell. Please note that, given 
the limits of Italian lexicon on odors, we decided to focus on words referring to 
objects and entities with odor rather than on odor words. Such has strategy has been 
widely adopted in the literature, since a number of results on odor have been drawn 
from tasks on sources of odors (that is, objects with smell), see for example CAIN, 
1979; ENGEN, ROSS, 1973. In keeping with grounded views of cognition (e.g., 
BARSALOU, 2008), we hypothesize that in such a task words referring to objects 
and entities (artifacts and natural objects) will activate their perceptual 
characteristics, and specifically their smell. More crucially, in keeping with more 
radical embodied views of cognition (e.g., GALLESE, 2008; for a review see 
BORGHI, CARUANA, 2015), we hypothesize that words will not only evoke the 
smell of their referents, but that the different smells words evoke will activate 
different actions. Specifically, we predict that pleasant smells will evoke an 
approaching action, while unpleasant smell should activate an avoidance movement. 
To test this hypothesis we performed a behavioral experiment using the approach 
avoidance paradigm, originally designed by CHEN and BARGH (1999). In the original 
study, participants were required to pull a lever toward the body or to push it away 
from the body while responding to positive and negative words. Results showed that 
participants tend to attract positive words and to avoid negative ones. In further studies 
that followed the approach-avoidance paradigm participants were asked to press two 
keys on a keyboard moving their hands either toward or away from the body (e.g., 
LUGLI ET AL., 2012), rather than pulling or pushing a lever. In our experiment, we 
decided to use this kind of response device. Words referring to artifacts or natural 
objects having a pleasant vs. an unpleasant smell [e.g., “armpit” (ascella), 
“fumigator” (zampirone) vs. “soap” (sapone), “apricot” (albicocca)] were presented at 
the center of a screen. Importantly, the valence of the words with pleasant vs. 
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unpleasant smell was not correspondent to the valence of the smell: for example, 
“armpit” and “broccoli” do not have a negative valence per se, but their valence 
becomes negative if one considers their odor, since have an unpleasant smell. 
Participants were asked to decide whether their odor was pleasant or not by pushing 
two different keys on the keyboard, so to respond they had to perform a movement 
toward or away from their body. We predicted that they would tend to attract objects 
with a pleasant smell and to push away objects with an unpleasant smell. Furthermore, 
we were interested in the possible differences between natural and artificial word 
smells, starting from the general hypothesis that natural word smells should be more 
salient due to their evolutionary role.  !!
3.1.   Method !
3.1.1.   Participants 
Twenty-four undergraduate students from the University of Bologna volunteered for 
participating in the experiment (10 males; age = 18-35; 3 left-handed by self-report). 
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were naive as to the 
purposes of the experiment. !
3.1.2.   Materials 
A total of 36 Italian words, 18 referring to artifacts and 18 to natural objects, with 
each set including 9 words referring to items with a pleasant smell and 9 referring to 
items with an unpleasant smell, were selected for the experiment. !
3.1.3.   Design and procedure  
Participants were explicitly instructed to judge the pleasantness/unpleasantness of the 
smell associated to each linguistic item.  
Participants sat 50 cm from the computer screen. Each trial began with a fixation 
point (+) lasting for 500 ms, then the stimulus word was displayed centrally, and 
remained on screen until a response was given. A feedback that informed participants 
about the response time was then displayed. Participants used a modified QWERTY 
keyboard to respond, which was placed in front of them in a vertical position (i.e., it 
was 90 degrees counterclockwise rotated with respect to its habitual position on a 
desk). The keyboard had no keys with the exception of the space bar and the F1 and 
F12 keys. In each trial participants had to start by pressing the space bar and to keep 
it pressed until they were ready to respond. When ready to respond, they had to 
perform a movement toward their body to press the F1 button, or away from their 
body to press the F12 button. The F1 and F12 keys were not the standard ones, but 
had been substituted with two big black buttons in order to increase the easiness of 
the motor response we requested. 
Given this arrangement of the response device, it was possible to have two response 
mappings. In the pleasant-near response mapping condition, participants had to 
respond to pleasant smell items by pressing F1 (i.e., going towards their body) and to 
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unpleasant smell items by pressing F12 (i.e., going away from their body); in the 
pleasant-far response mapping condition, participants used the reversed mapping. 
Participants were randomly assigned to 2 groups of 12 participants each in order to 
counterbalance the mapping they used to respond. In the experiment, the 36 critical 
trials were preceded by 4 training trials to familiarize participants with the procedure.  !!
3.2.   Data Analysis and results 
We eliminated errors (19 % of the trials) and trimmed responses by removing those 
trials which response time (RT) was 2 standard deviations over the participant’s 
mean. The remaining responses were entered in a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA with the 
between-subjects factor Response mapping, and the within-subjects factors Type 
(artificial/natural) and Odor Valence (pleasant/unpleasant smell). Newman-Keuls 
post hoc tests were conducted on significant interactions. 
The ANOVA on RTs showed that the expected main effect of Response mapping 
approached significance, F(1, 23) = 3.86, p =. 06, ηp2 = .149, due to pleasant-near 
mapping responses (M = 1488 ms) being slower than the pleasant-far responses (M = 
1082 ms) (see Figure 1). !
!  !
Fig. 1. Block 2 - Main effect of Response mapping !
The main effect of Type was significant, F(1, 23) = 20.29,  p <.001, ηp2 = .479, 
showing that responses to natural objects (M = 1379 ms) were faster than responses 
to artifacts (M = 1191 ms). This result is perfectly in line with a number of previous 
findings in the literature showing an advantage of natural objects overs artifacts in 
the processing of visual objects (e.g., BORGHI ET AL., 2011; FLUMINI ET AL., 2014). 
The interaction Type x Odor Valence was significant as well, F(2, 46) = 9.65, p <.01, 
ηp2 = .304, showing that natural objects characterized by a pleasant smell (M = 1157 
ms) elicited faster responses compared to natural objects characterized by an 
unpleasant smell (M = 1226 ms - Newman-Keuls p <.01), whereas the opposite 
pattern was observed for artifacts (pleasant smell M = 1410 ms, unpleasant smell M 
= 1349 ms - Newman-Keuls p <.05). Interestingly, this result revealed that RTs to 
artifacts with pleasant smell were significantly slower than RTs in any other 
condition (Newman-Keuls all ps <.05). 
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No other main effects or interactions were significant. 
The ANOVA on errors showed a main effect of Odor Valence, F(1, 23) = 29.31, p <.
001, ηp2 = .571, due to pleasant smell items (M = .85) producing less errors than 
unpleasant ones (M = 2.62). 
Two interactions were significant as well. First, the Response mapping x Type 
interaction, F(2, 46) = 4.34, p <.05, ηp2 = .164 (pleasant-near mapping: Artifacts M = 
1.83, Natural objects M = 1.70; pleasant-far mapping: Artifacts M = 1.25, Natural 
objects M = 2.17 - Newman-Keuls all ps ns). Second, and of greater theoretical 
interest, the interaction Type x Odor Valence was reliable, F(2, 46) = 23.90, p <.001, 
ηp2 = .521 (Artifacts: Pleasant smell M = 1.38, Unpleasant smell M = 1.71 - 
Newman-Keuls p <. 05; Natural objects: Pleasant smell M = .33, Unpleasant smell M 
= 3.54 - Newman-Keuls p <. 001). Interestingly, this result showed that unpleasant 
smells of natural objects evoked a significantly higher number of errors than all other 
conditions (Newman-Keuls all ps <.05). !
3.3.   Discussion 
The results show that, while comprehending words referring to objects, we not only 
activate the internal representation of the perception of their odor, but we also 
prepare a specific action. The motor system is clearly modulated, and this result 
supports not only grounded but also more radical embodied theories of cognition, 
according to which the processing of linguistic stimuli activates actions. However, 
the modulation of the motor system we found deserves some discussion. As 
anticipated in the introduction, we started from the hypothesis that participants would 
tend to attract objects with a pleasant smell and reject objects with an unpleasant one. 
The classical CHEN and BARGH’S (1999) approach-avoidance results consisted in 
an advantage of the mapping pleasant-near and unpleasant-far over the opposite 
mapping. However, in the literature there are also results favoring the opposite 
mapping, as those obtained by FREINA ET AL. (2010), who used the approach-
avoidance paradigm with the keyboard, as we did, and manipulated the hand posture. 
In one condition, in which participants held a small ball in their hands, the main 
result of Chen and Bargh was replicated. In another condition, in which participants 
reached the button with an open hand, results showed the opposite pattern, similar to 
the one we found in the present study. Freina et al. interpreted their results arguing 
that, when our hands are full, we tend to keep positive objects close and to throw 
negative objects away. But when our hands are empty the opposite becomes true: we 
reach for positive objects by moving away from the body, and we defend our own 
body from negative objects by moving toward it.  
Given the exploratory character of our study and the different results present in the 
literature, our hypothesis was two-tailed. Even if the response mapping effect only 
approached significance, our results revealed that the pleasant-far, unpleasant-near) 
mapping yielded slightly faster responses compared to pleasant-near, unpleasant-far. 
The interpretation of our interaction is rather straightforward in light of the previous 
work by FREINA ET AL. (2009). Our participants, who responded using an open 
hand, tend to reach for objects with pleasant odor moving away from their body, and 
to avoid smelly objects by keeping them far from their own body.   
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The interaction between smell and kind of concept (artifact vs. natural objects) is 
also of interest. While the fact that artifacts are slower than natural objects is in line 
with previous literature (BORGHI ET AL., 2007; FLUMINI ET AL., 2014; VAINIO 
ET AL., 2008), the finding that pleasant artifacts are particularly slow when 
compared to natural objects is completely new. This result suggests that, likely due to 
our evolutionary history, we tend to appreciate more natural pleasant odors than 
artificial ones. The same interaction found in errors shows that we are also more 
affected and we tend to suffer in a greater manner natural unpleasant odors than 
artificial ones. 
A caveat: In the experiment we did not use an implicit task, but only an explicit one: 
participants were explicitly required to evaluate the pleasantness of odors. Further 
research is needed to clarify if odors are automatically evoked upon reading the 
word, or whether an explicit evaluation of odors is always necessary to activate 
perception and motor responses. !!
4. Conclusion 
We hope to have convinced readers that odors, and odor words, are interesting for 
cognitive science (including philosophy). Here we have tried to make three main points.  
First, we have shown that the debate on the lack of a specific odor lexicon in Western 
cultures is sometimes misleading. Even if there are data showing that people encounter 
more difficulties in odor naming than in color naming, cross-cultural studies reveal that 
many languages encode odor words quite easily and have a rich odor lexicon, even if 
odors clearly do not have “pure” concrete referents. Furthermore, evidence on Western 
individuals shows that a specific odor lexicon can be learned with expertise. A note of 
caution is necessary, however: to date it remains unclear whether visual stimuli are 
better integrated with linguistic ones than odor stimuli, independently of the culture. As 
highlighted by OLOFSSON and GOTTFRIED (2015), further research is needed to 
investigate whether odors, compared to visual stimuli, activate a larger set of semantic 
concepts, and further cross-cultural studies are necessary to investigate the role played 
by cultural influences. 
The case of odor clearly exemplifies our view on meaning: it suggests that meaning 
cannot be exhausted by its relationship with a referent, and highlights the importance 
of the social sharing of meaning. Clearly, the less the referent is concrete and well 
defined, the more the social and cultural dimension of word use acquires relevance 
(BORGHI, CIMATTI, 2009; BORGHI, BINKOFSKI, 2014). 
Second, we have discussed the peculiar status of odor concepts and words. We have 
seen that odor concepts and words are peculiar, since they cannot be defined neither 
as concrete nor as abstract. Their simple existence poses problems both to theories 
according to which concrete and abstract concepts do not differ, and to theories 
according to which they represent a dichotomy. We have also outlined some possible 
research directions aimed at testing the special “status” of odor words. 
Finally, by asking participants to evaluate the pleasantness of objects with odors 
moving their hand toward or away from the body, we have demonstrated that words 
not only activated a given sense, odor, but that odor was related to a specific 
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approach-avoidance action too. This suggests that concepts, perception and action 
are strongly interrelated, as posited by embodied and grounded theories of cognition. 
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